Published in Forthcoming, 2019
We consider a persuasion problem between a sender and a receiver where the receiver may not be an expected-utility maximizer.
Recommended citation: Anunrojwong, Jerry and Iyer, Krishnamurthy and Lingenbrink, David, Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach (2019). https://ssrn.com/abstract=3386273
Published in Operations Research (Forthcoming), 2019
We apply Bayesian persuasion to the setting of queues and find the optimal signaling mechanism to be a threshold mechanism.
Recommended citation: Lingenbrink, David and Iyer, Krishnamurthy, Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues (2019). Operations Research, Forthcoming. https://ssrn.com/abstract=2964093
Published in In Submission to Management Science, 2018
We consider how a firm can signal inventory information to customers in online retail.
Recommended citation: Lingenbrink, David and Iyer, Krishnamurthy, Signaling in Online Retail: Efficacy of Public Signals (May 15, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3179262 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3179262 https://ssrn.com/abstract=3179262
Published in Math Horizons, 2016
We study positional voting systems and consider aggregations thereof.
Recommended citation: Sam Gutekunst, David Lingenbrink, & Michael Orrison. (2016). The Mean(est) Voting System. Math Horizons, 24(1), 10-13. doi:10.4169/mathhorizons.24.1.10. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.4169/mathhorizons.24.1.10