Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach
Anunrojwong, Jerry and Iyer, Krishnamurthy and Lingenbrink, David, Persuading Risk-Conscious Agents: A Geometric Approach (2019).
CV
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Education
- B.S. in Mathematics, Harvey Mudd College, 2014
- M.S. in Operations Research, Cornell University, 2017
- Ph.D in Operations Research, Cornell University, 2019
Publications
Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues
Lingenbrink, David and Iyer, Krishnamurthy, Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues (2019). Operations Research, Forthcoming.
Signaling in Online Retail: Efficacy of Public Signals
Lingenbrink, David and Iyer, Krishnamurthy, Signaling in Online Retail: Efficacy of Public Signals (May 15, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3179262 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3179262
The Mean(est) Voting System
Sam Gutekunst, David Lingenbrink, & Michael Orrison. (2016). The Mean(est) Voting System. Math Horizons, 24(1), 10-13. doi:10.4169/mathhorizons.24.1.10.
Talks
Optimal Signaling Mechanisms in Unobservable Queues with Strategic Customers
Talk at Eighteenth ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Cambridge, Massachusetts